



SQLsign

Past, present and future

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- No progress on the generic isogeny problem, despite SIDH attacks;
- Very active field, fast progress;
- Credible alternative in case other pq-schemes fail;
- ...but still a long way to go!

Supersingular isogenies and signing

2012 SIDH PoKs (DF, Jao, Plût), signatures (Yoo, Azarderakhsh, Jao)

2022 Ternary SIDH PoKs (DF, Dobson, Galbraith, Zobernig)

2023 *Curves you can trust* (Basso, Codogni, Connolly, DF, Fouotsa, Lido, Morrison, Panny, Patranabis, Wesolowski)

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CSI-FiSh (Beullens, Kleinjung, Vercauteren)

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CSIDH

Group, ring, threshold, ...

Supersingular isogenies and signing

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- 2017 Galbraith–Petit–Silva
- 2019 SeaSign (DF, Galbraith)
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- 2020 SQIsign (DF, Kohel, Leroux, Petit, Wesolowski)
- 2022 Ternary SIDH PoKs (DF, Dobson, Galbraith, Zobernig)
- 2023 *Curves you can trust* (Basso, Codogni, Connolly, DF, Fouotsa, Lido, Morrison, Panny, Patranabis, Wesolowski)
- 2024 SQIsignHD (Dartois, Leroux, Robert, Wesolowski)

SIDH

Best security


CSIDH

Group, ring, threshold, ...

Deuring

Most compact

SQLsign: Signatures from the effective Deuring correspondence



Most compact PQ signature scheme: PK + Signature combined **5× smaller** than Falcon.

Secret Key (bytes)	Public Key (bytes)	Signature (bytes)	Security
782	64	177	NIST-1
1138	96	263	NIST-3
1509	128	335	NIST-5


Elliptic curves

$$y^2 = x^3 + ax + b$$

Bezout's theorem

Every line cuts E in exactly three points (counted with multiplicity).

Define a **group law** such that any three colinear points add up to zero.




Isogenies = finite-kernel group morphisms: $E \rightarrow E/K$


Endomorphisms = isogenies $E \rightarrow E$

Isogenies: an example over \mathbb{F}_{11}

$$E : y^2 = x^3 + x$$



$$E' : y^2 = x^3 - 4x$$




$$\phi(x, y) = \left(\frac{x^2 + 1}{x}, y \frac{x^2 - 1}{x^2} \right)$$

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$$\phi(x, y) = \left(\frac{x^2 + 1}{x}, y \frac{x^2 - 1}{x^2} \right)$$

- Kernel generator in red.
- This is a degree 2 map.
- Analogous to $x \mapsto x^2$ in \mathbb{F}_q^* .

Some endomorphisms

Scalar multiplication: $[N] : E \rightarrow E$

Frobenius: $(x, y) \mapsto (x^p, y^p)$

(on curves over \mathbb{F}_p)

Automorphisms: $(x, y) \mapsto (-x, iy)$

(on curve $y^2 = x^3 + x$)

Endomorphisms = imaginary quadratic integers

Endomorphisms form a ring:

$$\omega \circ (\varphi + \psi) = \omega \circ \varphi + \omega \circ \psi$$

Every endomorphism satisfies a quadratic equation

$$\omega^2 - t\omega + n = 0$$

with $t, n \in \mathbb{Z}$ and $t^2 - 4n \leq 0$.

Endomorphism rings = Ideal lattices

$\text{End}(E)$ is a free \mathbb{Z} -module of rank 1, 2 or 4. As a ring:

- 1) $\text{End}(E) \simeq \mathbb{Z}$;
- 2) $\text{End}(E)$ is isomorphic to an order¹ of a quadratic imaginary field;
- 4) $\text{End}(E)$ is isomorphic to a maximal order¹ of the quaternion algebra ramified at p and ∞ .

¹order = subring of maximal rank

An example

The curve of j -invariant 1728

$$E : y^2 = x^3 + x$$

is supersingular over \mathbb{F}_p iff $p \equiv -1 \pmod{4}$.

Endomorphisms

$\text{End}(E) \subset \mathbb{Q}\langle \iota, \pi \rangle$, with:

- π the Frobenius endomorphism, s.t. $\pi^2 = -p$;
- ι the map

$$\iota(x, y) = (-x, iy),$$

where $i \in \mathbb{F}_{p^2}$ is a 4-th root of unity. Clearly, $\iota^2 = -1$.

And $\iota\pi = -\pi\iota$.

N -torsion

$$E[N] \simeq \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z} \times \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$$

*over an algebraically closed field

Endomorphisms = 2×2 matrices

Fix any basis $\langle P, Q \rangle$ of $E[N]$

$$\begin{aligned}\omega : E[N] &\longrightarrow E[N] \\ \begin{pmatrix} x \\ y \end{pmatrix} &\longmapsto \begin{pmatrix} a & b \\ c & d \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} x \\ y \end{pmatrix} \pmod N\end{aligned}$$

Tate's isogeny theorem

When E is supersingular:

$$\text{End}(E)/N \text{End}(E) \simeq \mathcal{M}_{2 \times 2}(\mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z})$$

When E is ordinary:


$$\text{End}(E)/N \text{End}(E) \simeq \{\text{Diagonal matrices}\} \subset \mathcal{M}_{2 \times 2}(\mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z})$$

Isogenies = Ideals

$$E' \longleftarrow \xrightarrow{\varphi} E$$

$$\varphi \in \text{Hom}(E, E')$$

Isogenies = Ideals



$$\varphi \circ \omega \in \text{Hom}(E, E')$$

Isogenies = Ideals



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The Deuring correspondences

Elliptic curves

Number fields / Quaternion algebras

Endomorphisms

Algebraic integers

Endomorphism ring

(Maximal) order

Isogeny


Invertible ideal

Isogeny degree

Ideal norm

Isogeny composition

Ideal multiplication



Ideal classes

Dual isogeny

Conjugate ideal

Two computational worlds

	Ordinary / CSIDH	Supersingular
rank $\text{Hom}(E, E')$	2	4
Endomorphism algebra	number field	quaternion algebra
Maximal orders	one	many
Ideal class...	...group	...set
Find isogeny $E \rightarrow E'$	hard	hard
Convert isogenies \leftrightarrow ideals	easy-ish ¹	easy ¹
Compute $\text{End}(E)$	easy	hard


¹When $\text{End}(E)$ is known

A loose analogy: discrete log groups

Input	Output	
Curve E , isogeny $\phi : E \rightarrow E'$	E'	easy
Curves E, E'	$\phi : E \rightarrow E'$	hard
Generator g , exponent a	g^a	easy
Elements g, h	$\log_g(h)$	hard

The Deuring correspondence (for supersingular curves)

An equivalence of categories (roughly)



The effective Deuring correspondence

Input	Output	
random E	$\text{End}(E)$	hard
random E	$\omega \in \text{End}(E)$	hard
random E	$\phi : E_0 \rightarrow E$	hard
$\text{End}(E)$	E	easy
$\text{End}(E), \text{End}(E')$	connecting ideal	easy
$I \subset \text{End}(E)$	$\phi_I : E \rightarrow E'$	easy
$\text{End}(E), \phi : E \rightarrow E'$	$I_\phi \subset \text{End}(E), \text{End}(E')$	easy

The endomorphism ring problem

Given a random supersingular curve E , compute $\text{End}(E)$


Contagious knowledge



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


Σ -protocol with binary challenge:




Galbraith–Petit–Silva (2017)


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
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

Equivalent isogenies \leftrightarrow equivalent ideals (KLPT)





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

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
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
Seeking a larger challenge space




----- secret key

————— commitment


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Secret Key	Bytes			Mcycles			Security
	Public Key	Signature	Keygen	Sign	Verify		
782	64	177	3,728	5,779	108	NIST-1	
1,138	96	263	23,734	43,760	654	NIST-3	
1,509	128	335	91,049	158,544	2,177	NIST-5	

SQLsign: the future


	AprèsSQI (CKMR24)	SQLsignHD (DLRW24)
Technique	Extension fields	<i>SIDH attacks</i>
Pros	Faster verification	Way faster signing Smaller signatures <i>Better security proof</i> Easy scaling
Cons	Complex implementation	Slower verification Monstrous mathematics Annoying proof artifact



Thank you

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